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THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
PREVAILING DEFENDANTS UNDER THE
WASHINGTON LONG ARM STATUTE
Numerous state and federal statutes award winning litigants attor-
ney's fees from losing litigants. The Washington long arm statute, sec-
tion 4.28.185(5) of the Revised Code of Washington,1 allows
prevailing nonresident defendants to recover their attorney's fees from
losing resident plaintiffs. The statute provides that when defendants
are personally served outside the state on causes of action enumerated
in the statute, the court may require a plaintiff to pay the defendant's
reasonable attorney's fees. This Comment argues that the judicial
implementation of this provision inappropriately inflicts injury upon
Washington plaintiffs while often failing to protect nonresident
defendants.
This situation arises for two reasons. First, the Washington judici-
ary departed from the maxim that the purposes of an attorney's fees
statute must guide its application. Such judicial reasoning contradicts
an important principle: An attorney's fees statute's legislative purpose
should dictate its proper application by guiding the court's decision
whether to award fees as well as their amount. The Washington legis-
lature did not articulate its purposes in placing section 4.28.185(5) in
the long arm statute. Its silence required the Washington courts to
hypothesize about the legislature's intentions. Consequently, the
courts fashioned and applied their own purposes to govern the award
of attorneys' fees under long arm statute. A comparison of the Wash-
ington courts' approach to fee awards under the long arm statute with
the general guidelines that govern the award of attorney's fees casts
doubt on the statute's constitutionality and reveals a number of fis-
sures between purpose and application in the award of attorney's fees
under the provision.
Second, the Washington judiciary has selected inconsistent methods
to calculate all attorney's fee awards, not just those under the long arm
statute. Additionally, no method of fee calculation accurately predicts
the extent of the plaintiff's possible liability absent litigation of the fee
issue itself. This failure prevents any estimate by plaintiffs of the extent
1. The statute allows a trial court to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants if their
activities in Washington, which are enumerated in the statute, create the plaintiff's cause of
action. These activities are the transaction of business, the commission of a tortious act,
ownership of real property, contracting to insure persons or property and the conception of
children or entering into a marital relationship in Washington. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.185
(1962).
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of their liability to defendants under the long arm statute prior to judi-
cial resolution of this issue.
The purposes of awarding attorney's fees under the long arm statute
do not justify fees awarded only to prevailing nonresident defendants.
Consequently, the provision should be stricken by the legislature. In
the absence of such action, the courts should alleviate the current ine-
qualities by applying the provision in greater harmony with the pur-
poses they developed and by using more objective standards to
calculate attorney's fees.
I. THE PARAMETERS OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. Architecture of the American Rule: Foundation of Principle and
Superstructure of Exception
Under the American Rule,2 prevailing litigants may not recover
attorney's fees from losing litigants. This fee system is almost unique
among the industrialized democracies.' The English Rule,4 used in
Great Britain5 and most Commonwealth6 countries, routinely assesses
attorney's fees as part of the costs paid by a losing party. The predom-
inant rule on the Continent also assesses the loser for at least part of
2. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796), is often cited as the wellspring of the
American Rule, but this is the subject of some doubt. See Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the
American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9, 15.
Whatever the Rule's origins, the United States Supreme Court has consistently declared its
allegiance to this early holding. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S.
240, 250 (1975); F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126-31
(1974). The Washington Supreme Court held in Larson v. Winder, 14 Wash. 647, 45 P. 315
(1896), that attorney's fees could not be awarded to prevailing parties. The Washington courts
continue to profess their fidelity to the American Rule on frequent occasions. Macri v. City of
Bremerton, 8 Wash. 2d 93, 111 P.2d 612 (1941), is the best and most complete early analysis of
the American Rule in Washington. The court held that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as
costs except when allowed by a judicially fashioned or statutory exception. This principle has
been affirmed in many cases. See, e.g., Joinette v. Local 20, 106 Wash. 2d 355, 722 P.2d 83
(1986); Miotke v. Spokane, 101 Wash. 2d 307, 678 P.2d 803 (1984).
3. Rowe, The Legal Theory ofAttorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651
(1982). Japan follows the American rule with the significant exception of fee shifting in favor of
prevailing tort plaintiffs. See Kojima & Taniguchi, Access to Justice in Japan-Japanese National
Report on Access to Justice, I ACCESS TO JUST. 689, 705 (1978); see also W. PFENNIGSTORF,
LEGAL EXPENSE INSURANCE: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE IN FINANCING LEGAL SERVICES
39 (1975) (fee awards in Belgium limited to amounts fixed by law regardless of actual fees).
4. For the sake of convenience, the term "American Rule" is used in this Comment to
represent the fee system previously described. The term "English Rule" represents a system that
awards fees to prevailing litigants as a matter of ordinary course.
5. See R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 518 (7th ed. 1977).
6. See Talmadge, The Award ofAttorneys'Fees in Civil Litigation in Washington, 16 GONZ. L.
REV. 57 (1980).
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the winner's attorney's fees.7 Finally, both Alaska and Nevada have
adopted provisions that repudiate the American Rule.'
Many passionate articles in legal journals during the last fifty years
have advocated abolishing the American Rule.9 But this scholarship
had inspired no strong reform movement to accomplish that end. 10
Nevertheless, the purity of the American Rule is compromised by
judicially fashioned and statutory exceptions11 that award fees to
7. See generally W. PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 3, at 39 (table of practice in eight Continental
nations).
8. See ALASKA R. Civ P. 82(a) (1987) (allows the court to award fees to a party recovering a
money judgment); NEv. REV. STAT. § 18.010 (1967) (allows the court to award fees in actions
involving $10,000 or less).
9. See, eg., Comment, Financial Barriers to Litigation: Attorney Fees and the Problem of
Legal Access, 46 ALB. L. REV. 148, 148-49 (1981); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees
and EqualAccess to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636 (1974).
10. See generally Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 792, 792-98 (1966).
11. Three prevalent bases exist for fee awards. See Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees against
Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 DUKE L.J. 435, 440 (1986). First, the common fund
doctrine, which provides for recovery not from the loser but from those who share in the benefit
of the litigation, is a partial exception to the American Rule. See generally Dawson, Lawyers and
Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974) (discussing origins
and development of common fund doctrine). Second, fees are awarded for misconduct in
litigation through the assertion of groundless or unfounded claims or defenses, or the assertion of
good claims or defense in a bad faith manner. See, eg., American Family Life Assurance Co. v.
Teasdale, 733 F.2d 559, 569-70 (8th Cir. 1984) (assertion of groundless claims); Lipsig v.
National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (fees awarded
where defendants engaged in dilatory tactics, failed to meet filing deadlines, misused discovery,
and misled court by misquoting or omitting material portions of documentary evidence). Third,
fees are awarded when authorized by statute. For a complete list see any issue of the Attorney
Fee Awards Reporter. See also Federal Statutes Authorizing the Award of Attorney Fees, Arr'y
FEE AWARDS RPTR., June 1986, at 2-3. The Washington legislature has created over eighty
statutory exceptions. See Talmadge, supra note 6, at 77-80. Other bases had little application,
and none plays a major role in contemporary cases. Dobbs, supra, at 439-40. Fee awards are
allowed when a contract between the parties so provides. See, e-g., Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S.
Hermes, 765 F.2d 306, 316 (2d Cir. 1985); Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324,
1337-38 (10th Cir. 1984). Fees may be recovered as an item of damages in malicious prosecution
suits. Cf Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833 (1970)
(allowing civil rights plaintiff to recover attorney's fees incurred in wrongful criminal
prosecution). Defendants may be liable for attorney's fees when their tortious conduct or breach
of contract causes the plaintiff to litigate with a third party. See, e.g., Mutual Fire, Marine &
Inland Ins. v. Costa, 789 F.2d 83, 88-90 (1st Cir. 1986); Eureka Inv. Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins.,
743 F.2d 932, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Fees may be awarded when the loser acts vexatiously or
in bad faith and when attorney's fees constitute an item of damages recoverable under ordinary
damages rules (as where the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for malicious prosecution or on an
injunction bond). See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-
EQuiTY-RESTITUTION § 3.8 (1973). Fees are also awarded in certain cases of contempt of court,
and in certain domestic relations cases in which one party has a duty to support the other. Id. A
few states, including Washington, make fee awards under the private attorney general theory.
See infra note 12; see also Senior Citizens Coalition v. Minnesota Pub. Util. Comm'n, 355
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litigants. 12
Six purposes often appear as justifications for either abrogating or
creating exceptions to the American Rule.' 3 The first, general indem-
nity, 4 forms the major brace of the English Rule. It posits that justice
requires the loser to pay, at least in considerable part, the winner's
legal costs.' 5 The second, compensation for legal injury or the "make-
whole" purpose, focuses on making a litigant financially whole for a
legal wrong suffered.' 6 For example, the legal system punishes mali-
N.W.2d 295, 302 n.10 (Minn. 1984) (stating in dicta that the private attorney general rule is
'well established," but citing only California law).
12. Thejudicially fashioned exceptions in Washington fall into five categories. First, fees may
be awarded when authorized by a contract between the parties. See, e.g., Granite Equipment Co.
v. Hutton, 84 Wash. 2d 320, 525 P.2d 223 (1974). Second, fees may be awarded for bad faith
conduct by the losing party. This exception is mentioned in some cases. See, e.g., Miotke v.
Spokane, 101 Wash. 2d 307, 678 P.2d 803 (1984). But only one case awards fees on this ground,
doing so without discussion. See Seals v. Seals, 22 Wash. App. 652, 658, 590 P.2d 1301, 1305
(1979). Third, fees may be awarded under the common fund doctrine when a litigant brings an
action to preserve or create a monetary fund. See, e.g., Hsu Ying Li v. Tang, 87 Wash. 2d 796,
557 P.2d 342 (1976). Fourth, fees are granted when the acts or omissions of a party to an
agreement or an event expose another party to litigation by third persons unconnected to the
original transaction or event. See, e.g., Wells v. Aetna Ins. Co., 60 Wash. 2d 880, 376 P.2d 644
(1962). Fifth, fees are awarded where a petitioner successfully sues to protect a constitutional
principle. See, e.g., Weiss v. Bruno, 83 Wash. 2d 911, 523 P.2d 915 (1974). Finally, fees are
awarded under the private attorney general theory when a litigant's action confers a substantial
benefit upon an ascertainable class of individuals. See, e.g., Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d 307. 678 P.2d
803. This purpose often seeks to enforce a right deemed to have special social importance. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980) (fee award under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976); CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (fee award to prevailing parties in certain actions
that result "in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest"). It also
frequently involves situations where governmental authority or resources are insufficient to
assure adequate public enforcement, or where successful litigation of such claims benefits
numbers of other people (e.g., by deterring other violations or making new law). See Herman &
Hoffmann, Financing Public Interest Litigation in State Courts: A Proposal for Legislative Action,
63 CORNELL L. REV. 173, 195-96 (1978) (a draft "private attorney general" statute to remedy
the lack of sufficient economic incentives for individuals to litigant for substantial public
benefits). See generally Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L.
REX,. 301, 305 (1973). For a discussion of the private attorney general concept in Washington,
see Talmadge, supra note 6, at 65-67.
13. See generally Rowe, supra note 3, at 652-66 (discussion and analysis of the six purposes
used to justify attorney's fees awards).
14. The indemnity system is a "two-way" fee shifting rule, or a system in which the loser,
either plaintiff or defendant, pays the winner's attorney's fees. There are also "one-way" shifting
schemes that most often award prevailing plaintiffs but not successful defendants attorney's fees.
Section 4.28.185(5) is one of a lesser number of one-way statutes awarding fees to prevailing
defendants. Legislatures often use a policy of one-way shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs to
achieve the end of favoring interests deemed to have special social importance. See supra note 12.
15. The concept of general indemnity is given little justification in the literature of countries
that use it. See generally R. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 518 (stating English Rule without giving
reasons).
16. The make-whole rationale is widely rejected in American practice. See Summit Valley
Indus. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 724-25, (1982). The United States
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cious prosecution as an actionable wrong" and allows counsel fees
from the successful defense to be recovered as an element of dam-
ages.18 Some jurisdictions, including Washington, allow fee shifting
when the action brought is unjustified for some reason other than
sheer lack of success. 9 The third purpose is punitive: fee shifting to
deter and punish misconduct, either in litigation or in the underlying
transaction.2" Fourth, the "private attorney general" theory justifies
fee awards on the basis of the public usefulness of advancing a particu-
lar type of claim.2 The fifth purpose seeks to alter the relative
strengths of the parties. This justification is frequently used when a
private party or small concern litigates against the government.22
Last, fee shifting is justified by its expected or actual ability to affect
the numbers of claims pursued, parties' settlement incentives, and the
speedy disposition of cases.23
Supreme Court did not question the basic soundness of the make-whole argument; instead it
raised tenuous collateral problems suggesting that the decision rests more on settled practice than
reason. See Rowe, supra note 3, at 657 n.27.
17. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-
RESTITUTION § 7.3, at 528; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 120 (4th ed.
1971).
18. See, eg., Weisman v. Middleton, 390 A.2d 996, 999 (D.C. 1978); see also W. PROSSER,
supra note 17, § 120, at 856; Annotation, Attorneys' Fees as Element of Damages in Action for
False Imprisonment or Arrest, or for Malicious Prosecution, 21 A.L.R.3D 1068 (1968).
19. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.185 (1962) (prevailing party to receive expenses for
opposing frivolous action or defense); see also IDAHO R. Civ. P. 54(e)(1) (1981) (fee shifting if
case "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation"); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1982-1983) (fee shifting when allegations
and denials "made without reasonable cause and found to be untrue").
20. A leading example of punitive fee shifting for the abuse of the legal process is the federal
courts' bad faith exception to the American Rule where a party refuses to recognize a clear legal
right or engages in bad faith conduct in litigation. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). See
generally Note, Attorney Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319
(1977).
21. See supra notes 11-12.
22. Several attorney's fees statutes award fees to prevailing plaintiffs because Congress
perceives certain classes of defendants as having superior resources or access to the legal process.
See, eg., Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, § 202(a)-(b), 94 Stat. 2325
(1980) (smaller litigants "may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against
unreasonable governmental action because of the expense" and government's "greater resources
and expertise").
23. One of the most widely accepted hypotheses on fee-shifting is that the adoption of the
English Rule will encourage the pursuit of meritorious small claims, discourage weaker claims by
the threat of adverse shifting and relieve court congestion. See Talmadge, supra note 6, at 69-70.
But it seems impossible to formulate any general hypothesis on this issue. See generally Shavell,
Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation
of Legal Costs, 1I J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982) (mathematical analysis of the effects of the English
and American Rule on litigant behavior).
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B. The Purposes of an Exception: The Touchstones of Judicial
Discretion Under the Long Arm Statute
Once a purpose is accepted as a basis to shift fees, it has implications
that suggest how a fee award statute should be applied in particular
contexts and what constitutes a reasonable fee.2 4 Legislative intent
usually governs the exercise of judicial discretion under attorney's fees
statutes,25 but the Washington legislature expressed no purposes in
passing section 4.28.185(5).26 The statute also has few analogs in
other state or federal statutes. Consequently, the Washington judici-
ary developed the two purposes that guide the courts in awarding fees
to defendants under the long arm statute. The first purpose attempts
to ensure that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendants
comports with standards of fair play and substantial justice by reduc-
ing the burdens on defendants in litigating in Washington. The second
uses section 4.28.185(5) to punish a plaintiff for frivolous or harassing
lawsuits. The court's award of attorney's fees under the long arm stat-
ute is discretionary.27 Absent a showing of abuse of discretion, its
decision will not be reversed.28
1. Mahnkey v. King: The Demands of Fair Play and
Substantial Justice
In Mahnkey v. King,29 the Washington Court of Appeals decided
that section 4.28.185(5) reduces the burden on defendants to litigate in
24. Rowe, supra note 3, at 666-68.
25. Id. at 666-67.
26. Legislative history in Washington was almost nonexistent when the long arm statute was
passed in 1959. Consequently, there is no written statement by the legislature of the policies
behind section 4.28.185(5). The fee provision may have been included as a compromise between
long arm statute proponents and the defense bar. Washington was one of the first states to adopt
a long arm statute, and its opponents feared that it would be abused by plaintiffs. Interview with
Phillip Trautman, Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law, in Seattle (May 3,
1987).
27. Both federal and state attorney's fee statutes and rules often provide for judicial discretion
in deciding whether or not to award fees. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k) (1982) (court
may allow fee award "in its discretion" to prevailing party); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) (award of
expenses, including attorney's fees, to prevailing party on discovery order motion. "unless the
court finds that [the losing side's position] was substantially justified or that other circumstances
make an award of expenses unjust"); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1978) (award of attorney's
fees under the Washington Consumer Protection Act).
28. Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 104 Wash. 2d 98, 101-02, 702
P.2d 128, 130 (1985); Marketing Unltd. v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 410, 412-13, 583
P.2d 630, 632 (1978); State v. O'Connell, 83 Wash. 2d 797, 844, 523 P.2d 872, 907 (1974)
(O'Connell I); Jet Boats, Inc. v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 44 Wash. App. 32, 37, 721 P.2d 18, 26
(1986).
29. 5 Wash. App. 555, 489 P.2d 361 (1971).
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Washington. The plaintiff in Mahnkey challenged the constitutional-
ity of the attorney's fee provision of the long arm statute on equal
protection grounds. He claimed that no reasonable basis existed for
making a distinction between resident and out-of-state defendants. 30
Consequently, the plaintiff argued, persons subject to the jurisdiction
of Washington courts were unreasonably divided into two classes:
plaintiffs who lose to Washington defendants and plaintiffs who lose to
out-of-state defendants.31
The court held that Mahnkey failed to discharge his burden of
showing that the statutory classification was arbitrary and unreasona-
ble. 32 The court considered the balance of relative convenience and
burdens placed upon both the plaintiff and defendant in litigating the
cause of action in Washington. It then stated that the burden on for-
eign defendants was lessened by the statutory award of attorney's fees
if they prevailed in the action.3 The court declared that the legisla-
ture delineated out-of-state defendants as a specific class to bring the
statute within the ambit of the principles of "fair play and substantial
justice"34 advanced in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.35 It but-
tressed this conclusion with the observation that the different burdens
placed upon nonresident defendants, especially the added expenses of
cross-country travel and bringing expert witnesses from out of state,
were the basis for the legislature's allowance of attorney's fee awards
to nonresident defendants.36
The Washington Supreme Court has upheld the purpose developed
in Mahnkey. In State v. O'Connell37 and Marketing Unlimited v.
Chemical Co. 38 the supreme court made section 4.28.185(5) a compo-
nent of International Shoe. It surmised that the attorney's fees provi-
sion was placed in the long arm statute by the legislature to bring the
30. Id. at 558, 489 P.2d at 363.
31. Id. at 557, 489 P.2d at 362.
32. Id. at 558, 489 P.2d at 363.
33. Id. at 558-59, 489 P.2d at 363.
34. Id.
35. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Other Washington decisions, some of which preceded Mahn key,
contributed to weaving section 4.28.185(5) into the fabric of "minimum contacts" analysis under
the long arm statute. In two cases the Washington courts noted that in balancing the relative
convenience and burdens placed upon the plaintiff and nonresident defendant, the ability of
prevailing defendants to obtain an award of attorney's fees fixed by the court lightened their
burden. See Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., 81 Wash. 2d 719, 725, 504 P.2d 782, 787 (1972); see
also Omstead v. Brader Heaters, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 258, 264, 487 P.2d 234, 242 (1971). The
provision is also seen as a shield protecting defendants from harassment. See Werner v. Werner,
84 Wash. 2d 360, 371, 526 P.2d 370, 378 (1974).
36. Mahnkey, 5 Wash. App at 558-59, 489 P.2d at 363.
37. 84 Wash. 2d 602, 528 P.2d 988 (1974).
38. 90 Wash. 2d 410, 583 P.2d 630 (1978).
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statute within traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.3 9
The court also sustained the Mahnkey court's theory that the distinc-
tive treatment afforded nonresident defendants counterbalanced the
expenses of travel and witness procurement.40
2. Refining Mahnkey: The Dual Purposes of the O'Connell Test
The purposes of fair play, substantial justice and greater defendant
costs proved inadequate guides to trial courts in exercising their dis-
cretion. Rarely would a nonresident defendant be unable to demon-
strate to a trial court some level of greater expense calling for the
award attorney's fees. The Washington Supreme Court sought to
remedy this problem in Stater. O'Connell. In O'Connell, it developed
a more explicit test to guide trial courts in exercising their discretion,4 1
while also creating a second purpose for an award of attorney's fees:
the plaintiff's misconduct.
Under the O'Connell test, a trial court first determines if the plain-
tiff's action was frivolous and brought only to harass the prevailing
defendant. If this is the case, an award of attorney's fees is appropri-
ate.42 If the plaintiff is not guilty of misconduct in litigation, the sec-
ond prong of the O'Connell test grants prevailing defendants fee
awards if they were subjected to burdens and inconveniences by
defending the action in Washington.43 However, fee awards are
appropriate only when trial courts establish three things. First, the
burdens would have been avoided if the trial was conducted at the
defendant's domicile. Second, the burdens are not balanced by conve-
niences to the defendant resulting from the trial of the action in Wash-
ington. Third, the burdens are sufficiently severe to justify the trial
court's conclusion that notions of fair play and substantial justice will
be violated absent an award of fees.'
39. O'Connell, 84 Wash. 2d at 605, 528 P.2d at 990; Marketing Unltd. v. Jefferson Chem. Co.,
90 Wash. 2d 410, 412, 583 P.2d 630, 632 (1978).
40. O'Connell, 84 Wash. 2d at 606, 528 P.2d at 990.
41. Id. at 606, 528 P.2d at 991. The O'Connell test has appeared in every subsequent decision
concerning section 4.28.185(5). See, e.g., Marketing, 90 Wash. 2d at 413, 583 P.2d at 632;
Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 104 Wash. 2d 98, 101-02, 702 P.2d 128,
130 (1985).
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II. DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE
ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER THE WASHINGTON
LONG ARM STATUTE
The amount of attorney's fees awarded under the long arm statute
must be reasonable. This determination is committed to the trial
court's discretion." Its decision is not reversible on appeal without a
clear showing that the decision was manifestly unreasonable, or exer-
cised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.46
The award of reasonable fees under the long arm statute presents
three issues. First, the out-of-state defendant must prevail in the
action before the court may award attorney's fees. Consequently, the
courts must develop standards to determine when a defendant
prevails. Second, the courts must face the problem of the amount of a
reasonable fee award. Should fee awards equal the defendant's entire
legal expense? Or must they be limited to the difference between the
amount defendants spend to defend actions in Washington compared
to their hypothetical expenditure to defend actions brought in their
domiciles? Last, the Washington courts must face the problem of
what method will be used to calculate the amount of the fee award
bestowed upon the prevailing litigant.
A. The Standards That Determine Whether the Defendant Prevails
In Anderson v. Gold Seal Vineyards,4' the Washington Supreme
Court addressed the first issue. The court's interpretation of the legis-
lature's intent, was that a defendant served outside the state and put to
the expense of answering the complaint and preparing for trial should
be reimbursed by the plaintiff if the trial court finds that justice so
requires.48 To implement this purpose, it held that the prevailing
defendants are ordinarily those against whom no affirmative judgment
45. Attorney's fee statutes often require the court to use its discretion to determine if an
award of fees is appropriate. See supra note 19. Legislatures also frequently require courts to
determine what constitutes a reasonable award while providing no standards to aid the courts in
this task. Most, if not all, attorney's fees statutes passed by the Washington legislature provide
no specific indication of how attorney's fees are to be calculated. Bowers v. Transamerica Title
Ins., 100 Wash. 2d 581, 594, 675 P.2d 193, 202 (1983). Federal attorney's fees statutes are
similarly reticent. See Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?. 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 281, 284 (1977).
46. Marketing, 90 Wash. 2d at 412-13, 583 P.2d at 632; see also Lake Stevens Sewer v.
Village Homes, 18 Wash. App. 165, 179, 566 P.2d 1256, 1264 (1977); cf State v. Ralph Williams'
N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, 87 Wash. 2d 298, 314, 553 P.2d 423, 435 (1976) (amount of allowable
attorney's fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial courts and is overturned only if there
exists a manifest abuse of discretion).
47. 81 Wash. 2d 863, 505 P.2d 790 (1973).
48. Id. at 868, 505 P.2d at 793.
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is entered.49 The court adopted this standard because it felt that the
legislature had envisioned not only situations in which the defendant
prevails on the merits, but also cases where the action against the
defendant is dismissed, as in Anderson, upon the motion of the plain-
tiff.50 Thus, any failure by plaintiffs to prove their claims may result in
an award of attorney's fees.5
B. Reasonable Fee Awards Are Not Limited to Partial Fees
In Marketing Unlimited v. Chemical Co.,52  the Washington
Supreme Court held it was reasonable to award actual rather than par-
tial fees. The plaintiff argued that fee awards under the long arm stat-
ute should be limited to the increased amount of fees that result from
trial of the action in Washington rather than in the defendant's domi-
cile.53 The trial court applied the O'Connell test and determined that
trial of the action in Washington was detrimental to the defendant
because his expenses were greater than they would have been in the
defendant's domicile.54 The court used its discretion and found that
an award of the defendant's entire lawyer's bill of $7120 was reason-
able, but it noted that eighty-five to ninety percent of this amount
would have been incurred even if the action was defended in the
defendant's home state.55 The plaintiff appealed the award of attor-
ney's fees as an abuse of discretion, claiming the court erred in award-
ing actual rather than partial fees.56
The Washington Supreme Court held that the only limit on attor-
ney's fees awarded pursuant to section 4.28.185(5) is "reasonable-
ness." 57 A trial court may award any amount, up to the defendant's
actual expenditure, which is necessary to satisfy traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.58 The supreme court found no abuse
of discretion because the trial court had applied the O'Connell test and
found that notions of fair play and substantial justice required the
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. The Anderson case also held that nonresident third-party defendants may be awarded
attorney's fees against third-party plaintiffs. Id. at 865. 505 P.2d at 795. The Washington
Supreme Court also held in O'Connell that an award of attorney's fees on appeal was permissible
under section 4.28.185(5), subject to the same criteria of reasonableness as the original award.
State v. O'Connell, 84 Wash. 2d 602, 605, 528 P.2d 988, 990 (1974).
52. 90 Wash. 2d 410, 583 P.2d 630 (1978).
53. Id. at 413, 583 P.2d at 633.
54. Id. at 414, 583 P.2d at 632.
55. Id. at 411, 583 P.2d at 631.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 412, 583 P.2d at 632.
58. Id. at 413, 583 P.2d at 633.
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award of $7120.19 The supreme court justified its decision by noting
the inconvenience to the defendant of defending the lawsuit in Wash-
ington due to the extensive correspondence preceding trial and the
costs of bringing witnesses and documentary evidence from another
forum to Washington.60
C. The Dichomtomy in Methods of Calculating Reasonable Fees:
Subjective Factors Versus Market Value
Two methods of calculating reasonable fees have currency in Wash-
ington. The first, the subjective factors method, requires the court to
consider a large number of unquantified factors. This approach is
modeled on the American Bar Association's 1908 Canon of Ethics, 61
which provided a list of factors to guide lawyers in setting their fees.
With some modifications, it continues to provide guidelines for practi-
tioners in Washington and elsewhere.62 These factors were never
meant to guide a court in fixing fee award amounts, but the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express63 used them for this pur-
pose. Under the Johnson approach, a trial court calculates fees by
considering factors such as the novelty of the case, the amount of time
and labor expended, the attorney's skill, the customary fee, the attor-
ney's prior relationship with the client, and the amount of the fee
involved.'
Shortly before Johnson, the Third Circuit adopted a radically differ-
ent approach. In Lindy Brothers Builders v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp.,65 the court of appeals held that the chief
59. Id.
60. Id. at 414, 583 P.2d at 633.
61. See CANONS OF ETHICS Canon 12, reprinted in 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 578 (1908).
62. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1983). The Washington
version, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (formerly CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2- 106(B)), has the following elements: One, the time and labor required;
two, the novelty and difficulty of the questions; three, the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly; four, the preclusion of other employment; five, the customary fee in the
community for similar work; six, the fixed or contingent nature of the fee; seven, time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances; eight, the amount involved and the results obtained;
nine, the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; ten, the undesirability of the case;
eleven, the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; twelve, awards in
similar cases.
63. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
64. The Johnson approach has found wide application. See, e.g., NAACP v. Richmond, 743
F.2d 1346, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1984) (fee awards in civil rights context); Harman v. Levin, 722
F.2d 1150, 1152 n.1 (4th Cir. 1985) (Johnson factors applied in bankruptcy proceeding); Derr v.
Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976)
(Johnson factors applied in union member's suit against union).
65. 487 F.2d 161, 167-69 (3d Cir. 1973).
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determinant of a fee award was the market value of the attorney's
services. This method requires a trial court to determine the number
of hours reasonably spent in providing legal services and to multiply
this number by a reasonable hourly rate.66 This figure is the "lode-
star" of the court's fee determination. 67  The central advantage
claimed by proponents of the Lindy method is that the separate ele-
ments of the factors approach are subsumed in the lodestar figure.68
For example, the quality of the lawyer's services is reflected in the
selection of a reasonable hourly rate; the novelty of the issues in a case
is represented by the hours reasonably spent in rendering legal
services. 6
9
The factors method was quickly embraced by the Washington
courts. In the same year that Johnson was decided, the Washington
Court of Appeals, in Wolfe v. Morgan,70 directed a trial court to ascer-
tain the reasonableness of an attorney's fees award as guided by the
factors contained in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility Dis-
ciplinary Rule 2-106.7" The Washington courts have faithfully used
the factors approach during the past thirteen years.72 However, a plu-
rality of the Washington Supreme Court held in Bowers v. Transamer-
ica Title Insurance,73 that the market value approach could be used for
attorney's fees awards under the Washington Consumer Protection
Act.
III. THE PARAMETERS OF JUDICIAL CAPRICE: THE
INEQUITABLE RESULTS OF THE WASHINGTON
LONG ARM STATUTE ATTORNEY'S FEES
PROVISION
The Washington judiciary has not adhered to the purposes it
evolved to guide attorney's fee awards under the long arm statute.
66. Id. at 167.
67. Id. at 168.
68. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that fee computation based on hourly fee charges
includes most factors in the determination of reasonable hours or the reasonable rate. See Blum
v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-900 (1984); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for
Clean Air, 106 S. Ct. 3088 (1986).
69. Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-99.
70. 11 Wash. App. 738, 524 P.2d 927 (1974).
71. Id. at 744-45, 524 P.2d at 931.
72. See, e.g., Seven Gables v. MGM/UA Entertainment, 106 Wash. 2d 1, 15, 721 P.2d 1, 8
(1986) (award of attorney's fees under the Washington Motion Picture Fair Competition Act.
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.58.050 (1978)); Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 95 Wash. 2d 679, 686, 628
P.2d 813, 817 (1981) (award of fees under the Law Against Discrimination, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 49.60.030(2) (1962)).
73. 100 Wash. 2d 581, 593, 675 P.2d 193, 203 (1983).
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This development has produced unfortunate results for both plaintiffs
and defendants. The courts' failure injures plaintiffs in three fashions.
First, the courts use the statute to make nonresident defendants whole
for a legal injury, but this injury does not arise from the plaintiff's
conduct. Instead, the defendant's injury springs from the court's
improper assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.
Second, the statute harms plaintiffs through the award of actual rather
than partial fees to nonresident defendants. Third, the Washington
courts have unsuccessfully grappled with the most difficult and signifi-
cant problem in attorney's fee awards: the methods by which they cal-
culate reasonable fees.74
Nor is the fee provision of the long arm statue a defendant's sentinel
as the courts suggest. 75 First, the statute predicates the award of fees
upon a defendant's prevailing on the merits. But trial of the action in
Washington may expose defendants to such prejudice that they lose or
are unable to litigate the case. Second, the broad discretion accorded
to trial judges to award or deny fees conflicts with prior judicial deci-
sions that established a low threshold for fee awards.
A. Curing Improper Assertion of Jurisdiction Through Attorney's
Fee Awards Is Unfair to Plaintiffs
Imagine that you represent a client injured in an automobile acci-
dent when a trailer and boat towed by another party crossed the high-
way and struck your client's vehicle. You sue the other party on
charges of negligence. You also commence an action against the non-
resident manufacturer of the boat trailer under a theory of strict liabil-
ity by asserting jurisdiction through the long arm statute. The court
allows the assertion of jurisdiction over the manufacturer, and this
defendant incurs legal expenses in defending the case. The jury ren-
ders a verdict in your favor against the defendants who towed the
trailer. It also renders a verdict in favor of the nonresident manufac-
turer. The manufacturer moves for attorney's fees. The court does
not find your action against the manufacturer frivolous, but in weigh-
ing the burdens imposed on the defendant upon the O'Connell scale it
finds an award of the defendant's total attorney's fees of $7500 is justi-
74. See Dobbs, supra note 11, at 462.
75. See, eg., Werner v. Werner, 84 Wash. 2d 360, 372, 526 P.2d 370, 378 (1974) (award of
fees to prevailing defendants effectively deters ill intentions or harassment on the part of
plaintiffs); Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., 81 Wash. 2d 719, 725, 504 P.2d 782, 787 (1972)
(section 4.28.185(5) protects defendants by an award of attorney's fees if they prevail); see also
Omstead v. Brader Heaters, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 258, 271, 487 P.2d 234, 242 (1971) (award of fees
to prevailing defendants lightens their burdens).
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fled. You are understandably perplexed by the decision. After all, the
court made the decision on jurisdiction. If the judge felt that the bur-
dens on the defendant were so severe that absent an award of fees
notions of fair play and substantial justice were violated, then why did
the judge assert jurisdiction over the case?
This situation illustrates the impropriety of fee awards under the
burdens section of the O'Connell test. The source of the defendant's
legal expense and injury lies not in the plaintiff's conduct, but in the
court's faulty exercise of its jurisdiction. Of the six purposes used to
justify attorney's fees awards, punitive fee shifting and compensation
for legal injury or the make-whole purpose find expression in the
O'Connell test.7 6 The first leg of the test explicitly incorporates the
punitive purpose that punishes plaintiffs for frivolous litigation. The
second part incorporates the make-whole purpose that seeks to com-
pensate a litigant for a legal injury. Proper application of this purpose
requires that the plaintiff's injury arise either from the conduct of the
defendant in creating the plaintiff's cause of action77 or from the activ-
ities of a litigant that force the other party to needlessly expend funds
on legal representation.78
The second half of the O'Connell test does not explicitly discuss
make-whole concerns. Instead, it invokes the liturgy of substantial
justice, fair play, and the burdens of litigation in Washington. But this
is a facade. The test shows little solicitude for defendants who lose on
the merits, no matter how taxing their burdens. The sine qua non for a
fee award is the failure of the plaintiff on the merits, and the corollary
76. Certain rationales are not present in the O'Connell test. It makes no pretense of
attempting to advance the public usefulness of certain types of litigation-the theory that forms
the heart of the private attorney general rationale. Nor does it aspire to implement general
indemnity. The English Rule awards fees to a prevailing defendant or plaintiff and affords the
court little discretion to deny a fee award. The long arm statute awards fees only to defendants
and judicial discretion plays a central role. While the provision may affect the ability or
willingness of plaintiffs to pursue legal action, this is a collateral result of fee awards and not a
stated purpose. Finally, the statute does not consciously seek to alter the relative strengths of
parties. In a given case, the plaintiff may have greater resources to support litigation, but one
cannot say that plaintiffs as a class have superior resources sufficient to justify imposition of this
rationale to aid defendants.
77. This principle was succinctly summarized by the Judicial Council of Massachusetts: "On
what principle of justice can a plaintiff wrongfully run down on a public highway recover his
doctor's bill but not his lawyer's bill?" Judicial Council of Massachusetts, First Report. II MASS.
L.Q. 7, 64 (1925) [hereinafter Judicial Council); see also D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 3.8, at 201 (1973).
78. Once again in the words of the Judicial Council: "And on what principle of justice is a
defendant who has been wrongfully haled into court made to pay out of his own pocket the
expense of showing that he was wrongfully sued?" See, e.g., Judicial Council, supra note 77, at
64; Rosenberg, Contemporary Litigation in the United Stales. in LEGAl INSTITUTIONS TODAY:
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES COMPARED 152, 162 (H. Jones 4th ed. 1971).
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is that this failure subjects the defendant to needless litigation consti-
tuting a legal injury. The make-whole purpose presumes that fault in
the loser's conduct causes the winner's legal expense. The first leg of
the O'Connell test addresses this type of legal wrong, punishing the
plaintiff for frivolous or harassing litigation. This fuses the punitive
and make-whole purposes.7 9 The compelling reason for making suc-
cessful litigants whole under the punitive rationale is that their adver-
saries are somehow at fault, either in their primary conduct or in the
course of litigation, in forcing the winning litigant to spend money on
legal services.80 But using the make-whole purpose to support fee
awards to defendants solely because they prevail on the merits
presents grave problems. The American legal system does not regard
bringing a losing case, in the absence of other fault, as a legal wrong.81
The underlying logic of the O'Connell test-that losing plaintiffs
should pay because they were at fault in initiating the proceedings-
cannot justify the imposition of attorney's fees. It untenably assumes
that one can always say what a losing plaintiff with a reasonable case
should have done other than to pursue it to judgment.82 Furthermore,
if the plaintiff was at fault in initiating the proceedings, the same logic
demands that a losing defendant should be held liable for contesting
the plaintiff's winning case and inflicting a legal injury by its recalci-
trance. And if initiating or contesting legal proceedings constitutes a
legal injury, Washington residents should also be able to avail them-
selves of compensation under the make-whole purpose for the legal
injuries inflicted upon them by Washington adversaries in initiating or
contesting litigation.
When a court asserts jurisdiction over a defendant it should assess
at that instant whether the exercise of jurisdiction conforms with the
79. See Rowe, supra note 3, at 661. The development of statutes such as section 4.84.185 that
award fees to prevailing plaintiffs or defendants subjected to frivolous claims or defenses has
made the O'Connell standard a legal artifact. No reported decision has awarded fees on this basis
under the O'Connell standard, perhaps because the test for determining frivolity under-the
standard is so unedifying. The supreme court in O'Connell denied an award of attorney's fees to
a defendant that claimed the plaintiff's suit was frivolous. It stated:
[C]onsidering the fervor with which the appeal was prosecuted, we cannot assume that the
appellants were less than genuinely convinced that their cause had merit, even though they
may have been mistaken in their understanding of the law applicable to the facts, as those
facts were found by the jury.
State v. O'Connell, 84 Wash. 2d 602, 606, 528 P.2d 988, 991 (1974). The defects of predicating
an award or denial of fees upon a subjective test of litigant enthusiasm are obvious.
80. See Rowe, supra note 3, at 659.
81. See generally Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity System, 55
IOWA L. REv. 26, 30 (1969).
82. This is a problem common to schemes of two-way fee shifting such as the English Rule.
See Rowe, supra note 3, at 655-56.
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notions of fair play and substantial justice. If the defendant is so bur-
dened by litigation in Washington that, absent an award of fees, fair
play and substantial are violated, the court should not assert jurisdic-
tion over the case. Allowing plaintiffs to proceed in these circum-
stances increases their potential liability as the defendant spends more
money to litigate the case.83 Reopening the jurisdictional inquiry by
use of the O'Connell test after the plaintiff has lost on the merits is a
tacit admission by the court that its initial determination was errone-
ous. These considerations dictate that fee awards under the long arm
statute should be made only to compensate defendants for their costs
in defeating the plaintiff's attempt to assert personal jurisdiction.
These expenditures are caused by the plaintiff's conduct and fall
within the parameters of the make-whole purpose.
A possible justification for fee awards at the end of the trial process
is that the court's assessment of the burdens placed on the defendant
when it first asserts jurisdiction is necessarily provisional and incom-
plete. Reassessing those burdens at the end of the trial allows the
court to better gauge the disadvantages placed on nonresident
defendants.
The Mahnkey court implicitly used this concept when it affirmed
the constitutionality of section 4.28.185(5). The court held that the
statute's delineation of out-of-state residents as a specific class was not
arbitrary or unreasonable.84  It justified this conclusion upon the
rationale that the costs of cross-country travel and using out-of-state
expert witnesses supported the special treatment afforded nonresident
defendants.8 5 Of course, the extent of these expenses cannot be com-
pletely determined until the trial is complete.
However, the award of attorney's fees at the end of the trial plainly
has no connection with compensating the defendant for the expenses
identified in Manhkey. If these expenses had been the legislature's
concern, then a better statutory scheme would be to require trial
courts to directly compensate defendants for these expenses. This sys-
tem would certainly be easier to administer because nonresident
defendants could present unambiguous evidence to the trial court of
these expenses. The court could then simply order the plaintiff to
compensate the defendant for the costs of travel or using expert wit-
83. Fee awards under section 4.28.185(5) also harm only plaintiffs that must assert
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants through the long arm statute. Some plaintiffs, able to
assert jurisdiction under other statutes, may avoid the attorney's fees problem altogether. See K.
ORLAND & K. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON TRIAL PRACTICE § 13, at 17 (1986).
84. Mahnkey v. King, 5 Wash. App 555, 557, 489 P.2d 361, 363 (1971).
85. Id.; see also State v. O'Connell, 84 Wash. 2d 602, 606, 583 P.2d 988, 990 (1974).
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nesses. Instead, the Washington courts award the defendant attorney's
fees at the legislature's bidding to offset the defendant's expenses in
travel and witness procurement. The amounts the defendant spent in
attorney's fees will almost invariably be greater than the expenses
identified in Mahnkey. This result overcompensates the defendant and
forces the plaintiff to pay for expenses that have no connection to the
Mahnkey court's rationale for upholding the constitutionality of sec-
tion 4.28.185(5).
These considerations suggest that the constitutional justification for
section 4.28.185(5) is suspect. In Mahnkey, the plaintiff argued that
the statutory delineation of nonresident defendants as a special class
was a denial of due process. The plaintiff observed that Washington
plaintiffs were unreasonably divided into two classes: plaintiffs who
lose to Washington defendants and plaintiffs who lose to nonresident
defendants. Because the expenses identified in Mahnkey that are
incurred by nonresident defendants are unrelated to the award of
attorney's fees, the fee provision of the long arm statute may unconsti-
tutionally penalize Washington plaintiffs who must litigate against
nonresident defendants.
B. The Award of Actual Attorney's Fees Is Appropriate Only Where
the Defendant Suffered a Legal Wrong
Imagine again our clients struck by the wayward boat trailer. The
court awarded the manufacturer its entire attorney's fees of $7500.
The accident occurred in Washington, all the evidence is located in
Washington, and the manufacturer engaged Washington counsel for
its defense. Naturally, some of the manufacturer's employees testified
in the proceedings, but you are perplexed by the award of the defend-
ant's entire legal bill as compensation for these burdens. If the court
had denied jurisdiction over the defendant and your clients had insti-
tuted litigation in the defendant's home forum its legal expenses could
not have been much less than $7500; indeed, legal services may be
cheaper in Washington.
The doctrine that reasonable fees awarded to defendants should rep-
resent their total legal expense is based on the theory that the only
limit on attorney's fees is reasonableness. 6 This theory is correct
when a fee statute's purpose is to compensate for a legal injury or to
encourage a plaintiff to sue to enforce a right. An award of actual fees
is appropriate if the plaintiff is guilty of frivolous or harassing litiga-
tion. However, when shorn from these moorings, the theory unjustly
86. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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penalizes litigants for correct behavior. It is incorrectly applied when
a fee award is predicated upon adherence to the standards of fair play
and substantial justice. If section 4.28.185(5) is to compensate the
defendant for the extra burdens of litigation in Washington, those con-
cerns are satisfied by an award of reasonable fees representing the
extra cost of litigation in Washington as compared to the defendant's
domicile. The judiciary's willingness to award the defendants the
entirety of their legal expenses also expresses the notion that the plain-
tiff has inflicted a legal wrong on the defendant simply because the
plaintiff's case was defective on the merits.
C. Attorney's Fees Are Reasonable Only Where Guided
by Market Rates
Picture a client who wishes to commence litigation against a nonres-
ident corporation for patent infringement. The case is complex,
requires a high degree of legal skill on the part of counsel for both
sides, and the course of litigation will necessarily be long and expen-
sive. Jurisdiction can be had over the defendant only by use of the
long arm statute. When you inform your client of the possibility of an
adverse award of attorney's fees, she is naturally anxious to have even
your very rough idea of the amount of her possible liability.
You will find it difficult to give her an answer. Plaintiffs facing pos-
sible fee awards to defendants under the long arm statute confront
both a lack of articulated standards to calculate those fees and the
confused standards used under other fee provisions. Statutes such as
section 4.28.185(5) present the problem of infusing the "reasonable
fee" principle with enough principled content to evenhandedly adjudi-
cate fee claims without full-scale litigation. The Washington courts
have articulated no standards for calculating reasonable fees under the
long arm statute.8" Further, the standards used for other fee statutes
are so confused that they offer scant hope of "evenhanded adjudica-
tion" even if they are applied to fee awards under the long arm statute.
The discordant decisions of the Washington judiciary on the standards
for calculating attorney's fees prohibit plaintiffs from predicting the
extent of their possible fee liability.
87. The courts that have awarded fees under section 4.28.185(5) have not selected a means for
calculating a reasonable fee. Instead they have simply accepted the defendants' calculations of
their legal expenses. See, e.g., Marketing Unltd. v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 410, 412,
583 P.2d 630, 631 (1978); Anderson v. Gold Seal Vineyards, 81 Wash. 2d 863. 865. 505 P.2d 790.
792 (1973); Mahnkey v. King, 5 Wash. App. 555, 557, 489 P.2d 361, 362 (1971).
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L The Failure of the Factors Approach
Washington courts use both market-rate and factors approaches.
The factors approach gives little guidance about the significance courts
should give the individual factors in calculating an award. The
method adequately serves its original purpose: aiding lawyers in set-
ting their fees. In setting fees, lawyers have the additional constraint
of market forces to ensure the amount is appropriately determined.
However, this constraint is not present in the judicial award of attor-
ney's fees, and the factors approach alone provides insufficient gui-
dance. The factors are presented as if they are all different and of
equal importance, while in fact they are neither. Some factors are
important only as evidence of others. For example, novelty of the case
is important because novel issues demand more time and skill. But
time and skill in turn are important in determining the customary fee,
another factor on the list. This overlap in factors causes courts to
make unjust and excessive fee awards. Some courts use the factors
approach as a judicial incantation, reciting the various factors without
analyzing their individual relevance, which increases the opportunity
for error."8 To confuse matters even more, other courts concoct new
factors for inclusion in the fee analysis. The result is a highly subjec-
tive system of fee awards.8 9 The potential for abuse through double-
counting or consideration of factors in inappropriate contexts is great.
Use of the factors approach means that fee awards cannot be pre-
dicted with any degree of certainty.90 Yet this may be why judges find
the subjective factors method congenial. It gives them a high degree of
control, requires neither hard analysis nor the taking of extensive evi-
dence about market rates for attorney services, and provides appellate
88. See, e.g., Davis v. Fletcher, 598 F.2d 469, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1979) (remanding to lower
court to explain the award calculation; lower court claimed to have "consider[ed] all the relevant
factors," but did not explain how individual factors influenced sum awarded). Washington
courts are afflicted with similar problems. See, e.g., Key v. Cascade Packing, 19 Wash. App. 579,
585, 576 P.2d 929, 933 (1978) (the court selected without explanation three of the factors of
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B) to calculate a fee); Lake Stevens Sewer
v. Village Homes, 18 Wash. App. 165, 179-80, 566 P.2d 1256, 1269 (1977) (the court lists the
eight factors in CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B) with no analysis of what
factors are used to calculate the fee); Connelly v. Puget Sound Collections, 16 Wash. App. 62, 63,
553 P.2d 1354, 1355 (1976) (another unadorned listing of the factors).
89. See, e.g.. Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1979) (reducing
fee award on basis of plaintiff's financial distress); cf. Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 697-98
(7th Cir. 1985) (fee award not reduced since plaintiff could not establish his indigence).
Washington courts have as yet been immune to such influences.
90. See Berger, supra note 46, at 286 (noting tendency of courts to give lip service to factors,
but to jump from unsystematic analysis of factors to unexplained lump-sum fee award figure).
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courts with little objective basis for review.9
2. The Superiority of the Market-Rate Method
The market-rate approach is superior to the factors method in cal-
culating attorney's fees under the long arm statute. It affords plaintiffs
advantages of a methodology that focuses on the objective criteria of
reasonable hours and reasonable rates.92 When the fee issue is liti-
gated, this formula provides a framework to confine the trial court's
inquiry to consideration of the evidence presented by the parties on
these two criteria. The method also narrows the scope of the court's
discretion by excluding subjective factors. 93
However, a difficulty with the market-rate approach is that the ten-
tacles of nonmarket, subjective factors have crept into the analysis in
Washington.94 In Bowers v. Transamerica Title Insurance," the trial
court used the market-rate method to calculate a fee award under the
9 1. See Dobbs, supra note 11, at 466-67.
92. Id. at 467-68.
93. Nevertheless, the market-rate method can provide only vague clues to plaintiffs of the
extent of their possible liability prior to litigation. While plaintiffs could roughly estimate a
reasonable hourly fee figure and the reasonable number of hours through judicious research, this
inquiry will be imprecise. Determining the time element in calculating fees under the market-
rate method is difficult. Few tasks in litigation are standardized. For example, a lawyer could
reasonably spend from ten to twenty hours on a task. Unscrupulous attorneys who work ten
hours but claim twenty may expect that neither opposing counsel nor the judge could dispute this
claim. Attorneys interested in maintaining their client's satisfaction have an incentive to limit
total fees. This inducement is hardly present when the paying party is the opposing side. Also,
judging the reasonableness of the hours an attorney devotes to a case is difficult. Attorneys have
different litigation styles. While they should spend sufficient time to perform a task well and
without waste or duplication, what works for one attorney may not work for another. For
example, spending great amounts of time on motions may save time at trial. Even if a judge were
able to investigate an attorney's style, it would still be difficult to dispute her reasonable hour
figures.
94. In theory, the Lindy approach supplanted the factors analysis in the federal system. The
United States Supreme Court embraced the Lindy approach in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 433 (1983). But the factors approach has crept into market-rate analysis in the federal
system as well. This process began with the Lindy decision, when that court recognized the
possibility that factors such as quality of work might justify increasing or decreasing the lodestar
figure. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161,
168 (3d Cir. 1973). The same court later recognized this error, but still left room for the practice.
Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117 (3d
Cir. 1976) (Lindy II). The United States Supreme Court has been similarly inconsistent. In
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-900 (1984), the Court took a firm position against including
the factors method elements in the market-rate determination. But in the Hensley decision the
court countenanced an open back door for importing such factors. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at
434-35. For a discussion of the difficulties in reconciling the two opinions, see Dobbs, supra note
11, at 469-70.
95. 100 Wash. 2d 581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983).
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Washington Consumer Protection Act.9 6 A four-justice plurality of
the supreme court exposed the shortcomings of the factors approach 97
and affirmed the trial court's use of the Lindy method, but not as a
separate method of fee calculation. Instead, the court saw the Lindy
method as a framework to purify the process of calculating reasonable
attorney's fees under the factors method by incorporating them into an
analytical framework that could be easily applied by the trial courts
making meaningful appellate review possible.9" It specifically identi-
fied quality of work as one of the factors usually assimilated into the
lodestar figure that might justify an increase in the fee award in excep-
tional circumstances. 99 Thus, reasonable hours times a reasonable
hourly rate produces a reasonable attorney's fee, unless the fee must be
increased to be "reasonable" because the court subjectively deter-
mined that the quality of legal representation was exceptional. This
analysis obscures Lindy's vision with market-rate mist.
Subsequent cases show a similar reluctance to forgo the freedom of
subjectivity granted by the factors approach. Lower Washington
courts interpret Bowers as confining the use of the Lindy approach to
fee awards involving the Washington Consumer Protection Act. They
continue to use the factors approach in other fee situations." The
supreme court abetted this process in Seven Gables v. MGM/UA
Entertainment.10' It held that a trial court had not abused its discre-
tion in awarding a reasonable fee when the amount was considered
under either the factors or Lindy formula.
If the methods coexist, then they also continue to merge. In Sno-
homish County v. Nichols,0 2 the court of appeals found that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in awarding fees because it had
obviously considered the novelty of the question involved, the skill
required to perform the legal service, the results obtained, number of
hours spent, and the prevailing fees in the market. This approach nul-
lifies the advantages of the market-rate approach. Once the use of sub-
jective factors is countenanced, the formula of reasonable hours times
the prevailing fees in the market is nothing more than the factors
method in the guise of the market-rate approach.
96. Id. at 597, 675 P.2d at 203.
97. Id. at 596, 675 P.2d at 203.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, eg., Baldwin v. National Safe, 40 Wash. App. 69, 74, 697 P.2d 587, 590 (1985).
101. 106 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 721 P.2d 1, 8 (1986).
102. 47 Wash. App. 550, 736 P.2d 670 (1987).
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Suppose a client who is served with process under the long arm stat-
ute engages your services. Subsequently, the court asserts jurisdiction
over your client. The trial court admits the jurisdictional issue is very
close, but assures your client that she is adequately protected because,
as the Washington Supreme Court observed in Werner v. Werner, 103
she is entitled to attorney's fees should you prevail in the trial on the
merits. However, your client's penury precludes her from supporting
litigation in Washington, and you are forced to settle the case despite
your belief that the client could prevail at trial.
This example demonstrates that severe burdens are not always
soothed by the balm of retrospective fee awards. Only prevailing
defendants are afforded the luxury of attorney's fees and not all
defendants prevail. Indeed, the burdens of litigation in Washington
may compromise their defense or improperly expose them to preju-
dice. Furthermore, the O'Connell test confers too much discretion
upon trial courts to grant or deny the award of fees under the Wash-
ington Supreme Court's decision in Marketing Unlimited v. Chemical
Co. 104 Under Marketing, the award of fees should be predicated not
on the trial judges's discretion, but on the mechanical assessment of
the defendant's expenditures. If the defendant in Marketing was enti-
tled to fees when the costs and burdens of defending the action of
Washington were ten to fifteen percent more than those in its native
forum, then the decision whether to award or deny fees should hinge
on whether the defendant can demonstrate this level of greater
expense. The scope of discretion should correspondingly be narrowed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The attorney's fees provision of the long arm statute demonstrates
the need for symmetry between purpose and application in all attor-
ney's fees statutes. If the application of a fees statute exceeds the pur-
pose it seeks to implement, then the result unjustly penalizes litigants
for the act of suing to enforce their rights. The use in the long arm
statute of the make-whole purpose to compensate defendants for
expending funds to defend against frivolous litigation is a proper
expression of compensation for a legal injury that results from the
plaintiff's conduct. But defining the plaintiff's failure on the merits as
conduct inflicting a legal injury upon only nonresident defendants vio-
lates the logic of the make-whole purpose in two ways.
103. 84 Wash. 2d 360, 372, 526 P.2d 370, 378 (1974).
104. 90 Wash. 2d 410, 583 P.2d 630 (1978).
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First, the statute improperly penalizes plaintiffs for exercising their
legal rights. Defining improper litigant behavior as losing a case on
the merits because it inflicts a legal injury on nonresident defendants is
unjust. Defining legal injury this way is a repudiation of the American
Rule for its English counterpart. The legislatures of Alaska and
Nevada have essentially adopted the English Rule and its concept of
legal injury. While the Washington legislature has the same power to
define legal injury in this manner and adopt such a fee system, its ben-
efits and perils should be extended to all litigants, not just plaintiffs
and nonresident defendants. This legal injury is inflicted upon resi-
dents as well as nonresidents, and upon plaintiffs and resident defend-
ants as well as nonresident defendants. These considerations dictate
that the legislature should either abolish section 4.28.185(5) or com-
pletely abrogate the American Rule. The fears that prompted inclu-
sion of an attorney's fees provision in the long arm statute were
phantoms. The past three decades and the wide prevalence of long arm
statutes without a similar attorney's fees provision demonstrates that
such statutes are not part of a plaintiff's arsenal of oppression. Failing
legislative action, the courts should confine application of section
4.28.185(5) to reimbursing defendants for the costs they incur in
defeating the plaintiff's initial attempt to establish jurisdiction.
Awarding fees after this point simply punishes the plaintiff for an erro-
neous decision by the court on the jurisdictional issue.
Second, the courts should end the practice of awarding defendants
their actual fees. Basing such awards simply on the plaintiff's loss on
the merits is unjustifiable under the make-whole purpose because the
extent of the defendant's injury is its additional expense in defending
the action in Washington.
Finally, the Washington courts should adopt the market-method of
attorney's fees calculation as a separate system instead of simply mak-
ing it a handmaiden of the factors approach. This is the only approach
that offers a way of calculating fees free from the vagaries of judicial
subjectivity that plague litigants under the factors approach. Incorpo-
rating the factors approach in the market-rate method simply contin-
ues the effects of the subjective approach in a different guise.
Many of the problems present in the attorney's fees provision of the
Washington long arm statute are common to all attorney's fees
schemes. Any such statute will present the same difficulties in calcu-
lating the fee award amount. And judges are equally vacillating or
reluctant to determine the method by which they will calculate attor-
ney's fee awards under other statutory schemes. These problems are a
price society is willing to pay for encouraging suits to enforce civil
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rights or environmental quality. But when a fee statute's purpose
serves undesirable ends, the costs are too high.
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